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Abstract
A potential determinant of intrahousehold distribution is the birth order of
children. While a number of studies have analysed birth order effects in de-
veloped countries there are still only a few dealing with developing countries.
This paper develops a model of intrahousehold allocation with endogenous
fertility, which captures the relation between birth order and investment in
children and shows that a birth order effect in intrahousehold allocation can
arise even without assumptions about parental preferences for specific birth
order children or genetic endowments varying by birth order. The important
contribution is that fertility is treated as endogenous, something which other
models of intrahousehold allocation have ignored despite the large literature
on determinants of fertility. The implications of the model are that children
with higher birth orders have an advantage over siblings with lower birth
orders and that parents who are inequality averse will not have more than
one child. The model furthermore shows that not taking account of the en-
dogeneity of fertility when analysing intrahousehold allocation may seriously
bias the results. The effects of a child’s birth order on its human capital
accumulation are analysed using a longitudinal data set from the Philip-
pines. Contrary to most longitudinal data sets this data set covers a very
long period. We are, therefore, able to examine the effects of birth order on
both number of hours in school during education and completed education.
The results for both are consistent with the predictions of the model.
JEL Classification Numbers: D1, I2, J2, O12.
1 Introduction
The decisions made by parents affect not only a child’s current well-being
but also its future prospects. A prime example is the amount of schooling
that a child receives. Going to school not only decreases the amount of time
spent working; it is also likely to increase the future earnings capacity of the
child. Uncovering how these decisions are made and what factors influence
them has been an active research area in economics for many years. Focus
has so far been on using differences between families to explain variation
in educational attainment of children. While this approach can explain a
significant portion of human resource investments it ignores the role that
intrahousehold allocation plays.
The Laguna Province in the Philippines, where the data set used in this
paper is from, is a good example of the importance of intrahousehold vari-
ation.1 A simple variance analysis shows that the differences among families
accounts for 49 per cent of the total variation in completed education between
children and that if boys and girls are considered separately, up to 60 per
cent is explained by differences among families. Hence, although the inter-
household variation is clearly important there is still considerable variation
within families. On average this intrahousehold variation is equal to approx-
imately two years of schooling. Furthermore, the variance analysis indicates
that the variation in years of schooling is greater among girls than boys.
Hence, one cannot satisfactorily examine parental decisions on human re-
source investments without analysing how resources are allocated within the
family. Increasing emphasis is therefore being placed on how parents distrib-
ute their resources among children.2 One factor that has received relatively
little attention is the effect of birth order on the allocation of resources. With
respect to developing countries only three papers focus explicitly on this area.
Birdsall (1979)3 analyses the effect of birth order on educational attainment
of children in urban Columbia. Behrman (1988b) studies the effects on child
health and nutritional intake with special attention to the effects of season-
ality using the Indian ICRISAT data. Horton (1988) looks also at children’s
nutritional status but uses data from the Bicol region of the Philippines.4
1The data are described in more detail in Section 5.
2Behrman (1997) is a review of the literature in the area. A recent example is Horowitz
and Wang (2001).
3Later published in Birdsall (1991).
4Examples of studies using developed country data are Behrman and Taubman (1986)
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The purposes of this paper are to analyse the relation between intrahouse-
hold allocation and birth order, which we do using a model of intrahousehold
allocation with endogenous fertility, and to present evidence on the effects of
birth order on intrahousehold allocation in a developing country. The plan
of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we discuss the different explanations
offered for why a birth order effect can exists. Section 3 presents a model
of intrahousehold distribution with endogenous fertility. The choice of the
measure of birth order and various econometric issues are discussed in Section
4. In Section 5 we provide a brief description of the data set and the area in
which it was collected and discusses the explanatory variables. In Section 6
the effects of birth order on completed education are estimated. The effects
on time allocation are analysed in Section 7. Finally, Section 8 draws up the
implications of the findings and suggests areas for future research.
2 Why a Birth Order Effect?
Researchers have suggested a number of potential reasons for the existence
of birth order effects, and we provide a brief overview of these in this section.
We divide the explanations into three categories: Constraints, household en-
vironment and biological effects. The idea behind the constraint explanation
is that parents either fail to take account of financial constraints over the
life cycle or that capital markets are imperfect. This makes it impossible to
equalise expenditures over children. If there is a constraint on the possibility
of equalising spending per child, first-born and last-born children will benefit
from higher average levels of spending since they spend more time in smaller
families than the middle-borns (Birdsall 1991). There may, however, be an
extra dimension to this problem. Parish and Willis (1993) note that if par-
ents’ earnings increase over their life cycle this may tend to favour later-borns
compared with the earlier-borns since the amount of resources is greater at
the later stages of the parents’ life cycle. It is also possible that the resource
constraint could lead to the older children entering the labour market earlier,
thereby increasing the available resources for the younger children.
Related to the resource constraint idea is the explanation offered by Bird-
sall (1991), who focusses on the time constraint of the mother. The basic
idea is that time cannot be transferred across periods. If the amount of
time a child spends with its mother matters for its human capital this would
and Kessler (1991).
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tend to favour the first-borns and the last-borns. This is tested by dividing
the sample into children of working mothers and those with a non-working
mother. The idea is that a working mother is not in a corner solution and
should therefore be able to equalise the time spent with each child. Birdsall’s
results indicate that there are, indeed, no significant birth order effects for
working mothers, while there are for mothers not in the labour force.
The household environment explanation says that the household envir-
onment changes with changes in the number and age of children present. It
has been hypothesised that the intellectual environment is an important de-
terminant of children’s education (Zajonc 1976). If this is the case children
of lower birth orders will have an advantage since they reside in households
with higher average education or IQ.5 This can be compared with the Bird-
sall (1991) model if one substitutes attention for education. While this effect
is likely to be most important for the oldest children it will also tend to place
the youngest children in a better position than the middle-borns.
Biology may also create a birth order effect. One possible explanation
is maternal depletion. Children of higher birth order naturally have older
mothers, and older mothers tend to have children of lower birth weight. This
would again tend to give the oldest children an advantage. There is, however,
also a tendency for the first-born to be of lower birth weight. Countering this
biologically disadvantage of the later-borns is the fact that the mother gains
experience in child care with each child.
Birth order effects may also arise due to cultural factors. An example
mentioned in Horton (1988), is the possibility that the oldest son is important
in funeral rites. Another potential reason is the need for security in old age.
Since the oldest children become economically independent first they may be
the most favoured. Finally, birth order effects can also come about as a result
of parents’ preferences. In the model presented below the way that parents
choose the number of children gives rise to a birth order effect, where the
later-borns are provided with more education than earlier-borns. This does
not require the parents to have special preferences for children of specific
birth orders. In fact, if all parents could be forced to have the same number
of children we would expect the educational attainment of these children to
be the same on average and hence not to exhibit a birth order effect.
5Zajonc (1976) also discusses the effects of older children learning from teaching younger
siblings and the role of spacing between siblings.
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3 A Model of Intrahousehold Allocation
Despite the attention that intrahousehold allocation has received in the lit-
erature there has been little attempt at integrating models of fertility with
models of intrahousehold allocation (Behrman 1997, p. 128, f.n. 7). This is
especially problematic when analysing the relation between intrahousehold
allocation and birth order since birth order is the realisation of the parents’
fertility decisions. Hence, this section presents a model of intrahousehold
allocation of resources with endogenous fertility, where, contrary to previous
models of intrahousehold allocation, such as Behrman (1988b) and Birdsall
(1991), the number of children is endogenously determined by parents who
take into account their budget constraint, the genetic endowments of existing
children and their expectations about the genetic endowments of possible fu-
ture children. Also contrary to Behrman (1988b) we do not assume that the
endowments of the children or the weights they have in the utility function are
in any way related to birth order. Still, it is possible to draw strong implic-
ations about the relation between the number of children, their birth order
and intrahousehold allocation. One of the main conclusions of the model is
that not taking account of the endogeneity of fertility can significantly bias
the interpretation of the data.
To make the model tractable we assume that there only one way of in-
vesting in children and that is through their human capital. The discussion
of intrahousehold allocation is often cast in terms of two special cases, the
wealth model model suggested by Becker and Tomes (1976) and the separable
earnings-transfers (SET) model proposed by Behrman, Pollak and Taubman
(1982). Both of these “competing” models include two forms of intergen-
erational investment (human capital investments and direct transfers) with
the difference between the two being that the wealth model assume that
parents only care about the total wealth (income plus transfers), while the
SET model assumes that income and transfers are separable in the parents’
utility function. The main difference between the outcomes of these mod-
els is that the wealth model predicts that parents will always reinforce the
genetic endowments of their children, while in the SET model parents may
either reinforce, compensate or be neutral.6 In spirit the model we present
is closest to the SET model in that parents have only one way of transfering
6See, however, the discussions of the models in Becker (1991), Behrman, Pollak and
Taubman (1995) and Behrman (1997).
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resources to their children and hence can be thought of as having separable
preferences between human capital and transfers, and that parents may either
compensate, reinforce or be neutral with respect to their children’s endow-
ments.7 Indeed, the model is based on, and uses the same functional form,
as Behrman (1988b), who also assumes only one mechanism of transfers. In
the empirical section below we will discuss the possible effects of other types
of transfers such as bequests in the form of land. The model also assumes
that there is no feedback from one child to another either through learning
as suggested by Zajonc (1976) or changes in the budget restriction (which
would be the case if older children would join the labour market instead of
going to school).
Each child is born with a genetic endowment Gi which, together with the
schooling input Si, determines the human capital outcome of the child. The
human capital production function is quasi-Cobb-Douglas
Hi = GiS
α
i i = 1, . . . , n, (1)
with diminishing marginal returns to schooling inputs (α < 1). The children’s
genetic endowments and how they are created are discussed in detail below.
Parents derive utility from their n children’s human capital Hi, i =
1, . . . , n and from other outcomes, such as parental consumption. The par-
ents’ utility function is separable between these two outcomes and the sub-
utility function for the children’s human capital is CES,
U =
{
(
∑n
i=1 aiH
c
i )
1/c c ≤ 1, c 6= 0∏n
i=1H
ai
i c = 0
. (2)
The parameters a1, . . . , an reflect the weights parents place on each child’s
human capital. To simplify the discussion we assume that parents place equal
weight on all children.8 Hence, a birth order effect cannot arise from different
weights given to children of different birth orders.
The proportion of income allocated to children, R, is constant, there is
a fixed cost k of having a child and pS is the price of the schooling input.
7An alternative would be to assume that parents care about their children’s consump-
tion but are not able to transfer resources later in life through, for example, bequests. This
is the method used by Horowitz and Wang (2001) who present a model of schooling and
child labour with heterogeneous children which does not allow for endogenous fertility.
8Hence, ai = a,∀ i ∈ 1, . . . , N , where N is the maximum number of children a family
can have. This is what Behrman (1988b) refers to as equal concern.
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Hence, the budget constraint is given by
n∑
i=1
(pSSi + k) ≤ R. (3)
3.1 Genetic Endowments
There are a number of important aspects of the model that we have not yet
discussed. These are what genetic endowments are, how they are observed,
how parents form expectations about future children endowments and how
parents decide on fertility. All of these questions are related but we will deal
with each individually to begin with.
Genetic endowments encompass a wide variety of different characteristics,
some easily observed, others not. The most easily observed, both by parents
and researchers, is the sex of the child. Endowments may also include other
physical characteristics, such as stature (or rather potential stature). More
difficult to observe for the researcher is a child’s resistance to illness or its
ability to convert calorie intake to body mass.9 Even more difficult to assess
are innate abilities or talents.
Depending on how human capital is measured the genetic endowments
discussed above will all affect the return to investing in the child. Say hu-
man capital is determined by physical strength, as would be the case in a
predominately rural underdeveloped economy. A child that grows more for
a given input than other children would hence have a higher return. This
child may grow more either because it is less prone to illnesses, and hence do
not have to spend energy on fighting diseases, or simply because he converts
calories into body mass more efficiently. Hence, even though we have cast
the discussion here in terms of human capital and schooling input the model
can be applied to any indicator that parents care about and for which the
genetic endowments of the child matter.10
The discussion of what genetic endowments are lead us to how parents
observe them or rather how soon they are observed. We will assume that
parents are capable of forming an opinion about the genetic endowments of
9It is, however, possible to determine weight at birth which may be a good predictor
for the child’s future health status.
10One obvious case is where parents care about children’s future income and there is
significantly different returns to investment by sex as there would be in, say, India, as
discussed in Rosenzweig and Schultz (1982).
6
a child early on in its life. While parents are generally able to observe the
genetic endowments of their present children, this is not the case for future
children. We assume that parents in family f know the distribution of genetic
endowment of their future children and that it is given by
Gi ∼ Gf (mi, σ2i ), (4)
where mi is the mean and σ
2
i is the variance. Furthermore, the density func-
tion for Gf is gf . This distribution can vary from family to family and by
birth order, although we for simplicity will assume that it does not.11 Again,
the sex of the child is a good example. Without prior information a pair of
parents will expect to have a slightly higher probability for a boy than for
a girl.12 Parents may also have information which affect their expectations
about the genetic endowment of future children, such as the presence of ge-
netically transmitted diseases in the family. It is possible that parents update
their expectations with each child, but we will not explore that possibility
here.
3.2 Parents’ Decision on Fertility
Parents decide on fertility sequentially; that is, they decide whether to have
a child, observe the genetic endowment of the child if they have one and then
decide whether to have an additional child and so on. Since we are mainly
interested in the relation between fertility and intrahousehold allocation of
resources we will focus on the final outcome and assume that the distri-
bution of human capital inputs takes place after the fertility decisions are
completed.13 This is not a serious problem if the majority of the investments
in children are made after the fertility spell is completed.
As shown in Appendix A one can derive an optimal stopping rule for the
11This does not change the results as long as each family knows the distribution for each
i and f .
12The prevalent sex ratio at birth is about 105 boys per 100 girls.
13It is possible to extend the model to become a proper dynamic model but we leave
that for future research.
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parents. Parents with n children will not have additional children if
(R− nk)α
[
n∑
i=1
G
c
1−αc
i
] 1−αc
c
>
(R− (n+ 1)k)α
∫ [n+1∑
i=1
G
c
1−αc
i
] 1−αc
c
g(Gn+1) dGn+1. (5)
The implication of this stopping rule is that parents who happen to have
children with high genetic endowments will stop having children earlier than
parents who have children with lower genetic endowments provided the dis-
tributions of genetic endowments are the same. Say a family has drawn two
children with average genetic endowments. If they decide to have a third and
that child has a high genetic endowment then they are more likely to stop
than a family which draw a low or average endowed third child. What follows
is a birth order effect where the last child tend to do best exactly because
parents chose their fertility taking into account the genetic endowment of
their children and having a high ability child makes it more likely that they
will have no more children. Notice that this result in no way depends on
having different characteristics for children of different birth orders.14
There are two special cases that are worth mentioning. The first case
is there parents preferences are quasi-Cobb-Douglas, which will arise when
c→ 0. Section A.1.1 shows that parents will distribute their resources equally
between their children and that the genetic endowment of existing children
does not matter when deciding on whether to have an additional child. In
some sense the model is then equal to a simplified version of the standard
household model of fertility where all children are assumed to be given the
same amount of resources. Since the amount of resources given to each child
in the family is the same we will not see any birth order effects since genetic
endowments are assumed independent of birth order, although human capital
outcomes will, of course, vary within the household since the children have
different endowments.
The second is when c < 0, which we will call the inequality averse case.
If parents have more than one child the they will distribute relatively more
14It is even possible to show that a birth order of the kind described here can arise if
the mean endowment decreases with birth order.
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toward children with low endowments to compensate them.15 As shown in
Section A.1.2, however, it will never be optimal to have more than one child.
Hence, parents who are inequality averse will only have one child. This result
has an interesting implication for empirical analyses which aim to estimate
parental inequality aversion.16 It is standard in these studies to leave out
one-child families when estimating inequality aversion, but if parents’ fertility
decision is based on their inequality aversion this will tend to bias the results
toward the pure-investment case (where c = 1).17 This is obviously more of
a problem in developed countries than in developing countries where there
are relatively few one-child families, but the result may explain why there
has not been any studies that have found parents to be compensating less
endowed children.18 Also, note that the result may not hold for a sample of
twins. That is, parents who happen to have twin when they only planned for
one child may exhibit inequality aversion, while it should not be the case for
parents who have twins of higher birth orders. To our knowledge there has
been no attempt of dividing the sample of twins to take account of this.19
To examine the extent of the birth order effect dependence on the in-
equality aversion in more detail a simulation study is presented in Tables 7
to 9.20 Table 7 show the number of children with each birth order, while
Table 8 show average schooling input and human capital outcomes by birth
order together with differences from the family means. As expected there is
no significant birth order effect when the inequality aversion is close to the
Cobb-Douglas case. This changes as we move closer to the pure-investment
case. The average human capital decreases with birth order and does so more
rapidly when c increases, which may appear counter-intuitive compared to
15A special case of this is Rawlsian preferences when c = −∞ and the parents’ utility
function becomes a Leontif function. In that case parents care only about the child with
the least human capital.
16For examples of these studies see Behrman et al. (1982); Behrman, Pollak and Taub-
man (1986), Behrman and Taubman (1986) and Behrman (1988a,b).
17Hence, the claim in Behrman (1997) that there will no selectivity bias from restricting
a sample to families with at least two children does not necessarily hold.
18Behrman (1988a,b) find some evidence of compensating in the surplus season in India,
but this is countered by an estimate which is very close to the pure investment case during
the lean season.
19There is, of course, a potential problem in determining whether parents who have twin
as their first children would have wanted two children anyway. This should, however, still
be the case that are significant differences between the parents’ inequality aversions.
20The background for the simulations is described in more detail in Section A.1.3.
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what was established above. Table 8 show also, however, that when we look
at the differences to the family average human capital for each child we find
a positive correlation between birth order and human capital. This is the
birth order effect referred to above in which later born children tend to have
a higher genetic endowment and hence also a higher human capital outcome.
Again the birth order effect becomes more pronounced as the inequality aver-
sion approaches the pure-investment case.
The implications of this are important for our further analysis. Ima-
gine that one wanted to estimate the relation between birth order and hu-
man capital using our simulation data. Doing so without taking account of
the endogeneity of fertility would lead one to say that there is a significant
negative birth order effect (as long as preferences are not too close to the
Cobb-Douglas case). This is, however, not correct. The correct estimation
method is to take account of fertility and doing so would lead to a significant
positive birth order effect. Hence, using the wrong estimation method can
seriously bias the results and may even lead to exactly the opposite result of
the correct one!
A second simulation exercise is presented in Table 10, which shows the
effects of changing the cost of children and the amount of resources devoted
to them. Increasing R leads to higher fertility, while the effects on mean
human capital and the measures of differences are ambiguous. The effects of
increasing k are a reduction in fertility and an increase in average education,
although the pattern when looking only at households with two or more
children is ambiguous. Not surprisingly an increase in the cost of children
also leads to higher differences. Provided that the fixed cost of children
increases faster than the total amount of resources devoted to children, the
results are consistent with the observed development in fertility. This is
consistent with k being related to the female wage rate as would be the
case if the main fixed cost of having a child is the time the mother spends
not working. Furthermore, as well as a smaller c leads to less of a birth
order effect, a smaller α also leads to less of a birth order effect. Finally,
it is possible to show that the positive birth order effect can arise even if
the average genetic endowment is decreasing with birth order, although the
effect will not be very pronounced.
In sum, the model presented here have shown that a birth order effect in
intrahousehold allocation can arise even without assumptions about parental
preferences for specific birth order children or genetic endowments varying
by birth order. The important contribution is that fertility is treated as en-
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dogenous, something which other models of intrahousehold allocation have
ignored despite the large literature on determinants of fertility (See, for ex-
ample, Schultz 1997). The implication of the model presented is that there is
no inherent preference for first- or earlier-born. Rather children with higher
birth orders have an advantage over siblings of lower birth orders. This is
contrary to other models of the effect of birth order on intrahousehold alloca-
tion. The model furthermore show that not taking account of the endogeneity
of fertility when analysing intrahousehold allocation may seriously bias the
results.
4 Measures of Birth Order
Previous studies of birth order effects have often focussed on completed edu-
cation or some measures attempting to capture it. Instead, we analyse both
completed education and the time used on school activities. In this section
we discuss two issues: The choice of which measure of birth order to use and
the problems associated with unobservable heterogeneity. Issues that relate
specifically to either completed education or time in school are examined in
the relevant sections.21
The first issue is what measure of birth order to use. Economic theory
does not provide any indication of suitable measures making the choice some-
what ad hoc. The three papers mentioned in the Introduction all use different
measures of birth order. Horton (1988) uses the absolute birth order of each
child with the first-born child given a birth order of zero. Behrman (1988b)
does not have information on the absolute birth order of the children in his
sample and therefore uses the relative birth order. Finally, Birdsall (1991)
employs dummies for first- and last-born children. Obviously, the absolute
birth order is the most natural candidate and this is the first measure we
use. The main problem with using absolute birth order is that most of the
variation will be due to larger families. In order to counter this problem we
21As mentioned above there may also be other types of transfers between parents and
children such as direct transfers or bequests. We unfortunately do not have data on
these other transfers and therefore focus on human capital investments. Since most of the
household are not wealthy or have much land (only 23 percent have any land and average
landholding for those are less than an acre) we expect that the most substantial transfer of
resources from parents to children take place through human capital investment. Quisumb-
ing (1994) examines human capital investments and other intergenerational transfers in
another area of the Philippines.
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also employ a measure of relative birth order. The relative birth order is
constructed such that the first-born’s relative birth order equals zero and the
last-born’s equals one and is defined as p−1
n−1 , where p is the birth order and
n the number of children in the family. Other approaches have also been
considered and we will return to this issue in the following two sections.
The second problem arises due to the fact that what we estimate is equi-
valent to a demand system, conditional on the birth order of the child. This
is a problem since birth order, which is a measure of fertility, is likely to be
correlated with unobservable characteristics of the household. This will lead
to biased results if fertility and education are determined simultaneously by
the family taking into consideration these characteristics. Examples of such
characteristics are the fecundity of the women and the preferences of the
couple. One way to solve this problem is by using household fixed effects
that control for the unobservable characteristics.22 The main drawback of
this approach is that it is not possible to directly include variables that do
not vary between children of the same household, such as the education of
the parents or the amount of land owned. It is, however, possible to control
for interactions between birth order and these variables.
While controlling for household fixed effects should reduce the problems
inherent in using a conditional demand framework, it is not a perfect remedy.
It is also likely that there is unobservable individual heterogeneity. If, for
example, the family has a child with high potential for schooling this may
lead the family to adjust their fertility objective downward and invest more
resources in this child. It follows that we should ideally take into account
both the individual heterogeneity and the dynamic programming aspect of
fertility and education. Unfortunately, the usual way of controlling for in-
dividual heterogeneity, including individual fixed effects, is not possible in
this context, because all time invariant characteristics (like birth order) are
then unidentified. However, if the unobserved individual effects (including
the endowment of the child) are uncorrelated with birth order, the estimates
should be unbiased. For the moment we conjecture that the most important
aspect is the heterogeneity at the household level and leave the individual
heterogeneity and dynamic programming problem for future research.
22This is equivalent to considering differences to the family mean. Note that using
random effects is not an option since that method requires that the error term and the
explanatory variables are uncorrelated.
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5 Data
The data in this paper are from the Laguna Multipurpose Household Sur-
veys.23 The first survey took place in 1975 and since then resurveys have
taken place in 1977, 1982, 1985, 1990, 1992 and 1998 on a progressively
smaller number of households using almost the same questionnaire. Unfor-
tunately, the 1975 survey round is unavailable and time allocation data were
not collected for the 1998 resurvey. The 1998 resurvey does, however, al-
low us to study the completed education of the children of the household
followed throughout the first five waves. The background for the original
survey is described in Evenson (1978a, Appendix) and Evenson, Popkin and
Quizon (1980). Evenson (1978a) contains a collection of 13 papers using
data from the Laguna Province. Other works using data from the Laguna
Province include King and Evenson (1983), Evenson (1978b, 1994, 1996) and
Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1986).
The Laguna Province, located south of Manila, covers a 1,759 sq. km.
area, and had a population of 803,750 in 1975 with a growth rate of 2.8 per
cent (See Ho 1979). It is bounded on the north by the province of Rizal, on
the east by Quezon, on the west by Cavite, and on the south by Batangas.
While Laguna is an inland province, it does have a big fresh water lake
(Laguna de Bay) that constitutes most of the province’s northern border.
About 80 per cent of the total area of the province, which mainly consists
of plains, with some elevated area in the northeast, is used for agriculture,
and water supplies are reliable and abundant in most parts. However, heavy
rains and severe storms can damage crops and other assets.
In 1975 the shortest distance between the province and Manila was about
30 kilometers. During the survey period Manila has expanded so that some
areas in the northern part of the province are now within Manila’s urban
zone. This proximity to Manila, together with the fact that it is home to
the country’s largest agricultural college and the International Rice Research
Institute (IRRI), as well as having fertile land, explains why Laguna is one of
the more developed provinces in the Philippines. The surveyed households
are located in 20 different villages or communities, also known as barangays.
The educational system in the Philippines consists of an elementary school
with six grades;24 a high school with four grades; a college with either four or
23The survey is actually called several different things such as the Laguna Household
Studies Project or the Laguna Household Economics Survey.
24Some private schools do have a seventh grade elementary class but if a respondent
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five years of education; and finally post graduate study. There is mandatory
schooling from the first academic year after a child reaches age seven and until
completion of elementary education; that is, until the child is approximately
thirteen years old. Most of the elementary schools are public and tuition-
free, but secondary schools and colleges are mostly private. The educational
policy in the Philippines and its effect on the level of schooling are examined
in King and Lillard (1987). Here the educational attainment is measured in
years. An additional year is added if the college is left with a degree, that
is four years of college education with a degree is equivalent to five years of
college education without a degree. Post graduate study and post graduate
study with a degree are equivalent to respectively seventeen and eighteen
years of education. Some parents have received vocational training, which is
taken as being equal to ten years of education.
[Table 1 about here.]
The choice of explanatory variables is partly dictated by the model presen-
ted above and partly by the availability of information in the surveys. The
most important is, of course, the birth order of the children, the measure of
which is discussed above. Furthermore, the sex and age of the children are
also included.25 Ideally we would like to use variables that directly capture
the amount of resources devoted to children and the cost of children since
these play an important part in the model.26 Unfortunately, there is no direct
measure of these variables in our data set. Instead we use the education of
the mother and of the father and the value of the household’s land holdings
(measured in 10 millions of pesos). The education of the mother serves as a
proxy for the cost of children since it is mainly the mother’s time that goes
in having and rearing the children and increasing education leads to a higher
opportunity cost of time. Since the father’s time is generally not involved
to any great extent in the rearing of children his education can be viewed as
having a pure income effect on the demand for children and human capital.
The value of the household’s landholding is expected to both increase the
income of the household and reduce the cost of children (since they can work
has more than elementary school education it is not indicated whether he received six or
seven years of elementary schooling.
25We return to the reason for including age and the interpretation of its effect in the
next section.
26Denoted by R and k respectively in the model.
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on the land).27 As with all proxy variable one has to worry about to what
extent they capture what they are supposed to. If, say, the mother’s educa-
tion influences not only the cost of children but also her inequality aversion,
although that is not modelled here, and this preference effect is strong then
one cannot use the model to draw inferences about the effect of maternal
education directly.
The three household variables are all interacted with the birth order of
the individual children in the household. There are two reasons for using the
interaction. First, as discussed above there using a household fixed model
means that the effects of all variables that do not vary within the household
cannot be estimated, while it is possible to estimate the effect of the inter-
actions. Secondly, by using the interaction terms we are able to determine
whether or not the birth order effect becomes more or less important with
parental education and land holdings, which makes the interactions interest-
ing in their own right.
6 Completed Education
As mentioned above we analyse the effect of birth order on completed edu-
cation as well as the time spent in school. This section examines completed
education. First, various issues concerning the data are discussed. Secondly,
we look at the within family distribution of education. Thirdly, the estima-
tion strategy is examined and, finally, the results are presented.
The data used in this section are from the last wave of the survey. The
data were collected in 1998, when most of the children in the households were
adults and had completed their education. We have excluded four households
because there was no information on one or both of the parents’ education
and one household with only one child. The final size of the sample is 790
children between 13 and 53 years of age from 126 households. Of these 790
children, 411 are boys (52 percent) and they have an average education of
8.5 years. The average length of schooling of the 379 girls is 9.7 years. This
is significantly higher than that of the boys.28 In the 1998 sample 70 (or 8.8
percent) of the children are still in school. Finally, the average number of
children per household is 6.6.
27An alternative interpretation is discussed below.
28The corresponding figures for children older than 24 are 8.6 and 9.8 for boys and girls
respectively.
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One potential problem with the data is that there may be households that
have not completed their fertility. This could lead to biased estimates of the
effects of birth order, especially when using the relative birth order, since
the children categorised as last-born would not really be the last children.
In this case, however, that is unlikely to be a problem since the average age
of mothers is 54.7 years. Furthermore, the youngest mother in the sample is
41 years old and hence at the end of her reproductive period. The potential
bias due to incomplete fertility spells is likely to be a problem when analysing
time in school and will therefore be discussed in more detail below.
Another potential problem is that not all children have finished school.
Not taking into account the fact that these children will most likely have a
higher education than the one currently attributed to them, could lead to
biased estimates of the effect of birth order. We have excluded children less
than 13 years of age to minimise this problem.
6.1 The Distribution of Completed Education
Before modelling completed education we examine the distribution of educa-
tional attainment among children, especially the within family distribution.
As discussed in the Introduction there is considerable variation within famil-
ies. On average the variation is equal to approximately two years of schooling
and is higher for girls than for boys. The within family variation is analysed
by regressing the within family variation, measured by the standard devi-
ation in educational outcomes, on a set of different family characteristics.29
This is done for the complete sample and for two sub-samples containing
boys and girls, respectively. In the two sub-samples we use the variation
in the educational outcomes of the sons (daughters) within a family, which
implies that only families with more than one son (daughter) can be used.
The results of the analysis are presented in Table 2.
[Table 2 about here.]
29Other measures of the within family variation (as the within family variance and the
mean of the absolute deviation) have been applied but the results are not substantially
different. The family characteristics are parental education and land holdings. Mothers
have an average education of 5.5 years (standard deviation: 2.7), while fathers have an
average of 5.3 years (standard deviation: 2.8). Of the 126 household, 26 own some amount
of land, with an average value of land for all household of 727,357 peso (standard deviation:
3,332,842).
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The education of the mothers appears to be a very important factor in
equalising the educational outcome of the children, while the education of the
father and the value of land owned do not have significant impact. Dividing
the sample by sex reveals, however, that the mother’s education does in fact
only have a significant effect on the equality of boys’ education, while there
is no significant effect on the equality of girls. As this section shows there is a
considerable within family variation in completed education. In the following
subsections we use our model of completed education to investigate how much
of the differences within a family can be explained by birth order effects.
[Table 3 about here.]
6.2 A Censored Ordered Conditional Logit Model
Since educational attainment is inherently a discrete variable an ordered logit
or an ordered probit model is often used (See for example King and Lillard
1987). We extend the standard ordered logit model to account for unobserved
household specific effects and censoring. Fortunately, a clear indication of
which observations are censored is available, since we know if the child is still
enrolled in school. If the child is in school educational attainment is defined
as censored and the censoring point is the education obtained. To formalise
the model, we begin by considering a model without censoring (an ordered
logit model).
Let yij be the final educational attainment of child i in household j, where
yij ∈ {0, . . . , K} and K is the maximal level of education. Final education
is generated by a latent variable, y∗ij, such that
yij =

0 if y∗ij ≤ θ1
1 if θ1 < y
∗
ij ≤ θ2
...
K if θK < y
∗
ij
.
The latent variable is determined by
y∗ij = xitβ + µj + εij,
where the vector xij includes the explanatory variables, µj is a household
specific effect and εij the error term. The cumulative distribution function
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of εij conditioned on xij and µj is given by
F (z) =
exp(z)
1 + exp(z)
.
To estimate an ordered logit with fixed effects one solution is to transform
the model into K different logit models using the continuation regression
model (see Andersen 1997, pp. 188-190). The estimation is then performed
as a two step procedure. In a standard logit model with fixed effects the β
parameters can be estimated using the conditional logit approach.
The first step is to define K new variables. Let skij be a binary variable,
equal to one if yij ≤ k and zero otherwise. These K variables s0ij, . . . , sK−1ij
follow logit models where
Pr(skij = 1) = Pr(yij ≤ k) = F (θk+1 − xijβ − µj) k = 0, . . . , K − 1.
The advantage of using the s-variables is that it is possible to obtain a con-
sistent estimate of β in a logit model when conditional maximum likelihood
estimation is applied (see Chamberlain 1980 or Andersen 1973). From the
K different s-variables we obtain K different estimates of β.
In the second step we use minimum distance estimation to obtain one
estimate of β. Let δ be a vector of the K different estimates of β such that
δ = ( βˆ(0)′, . . . , βˆ(K−1)′)′. A new estimate of β is found by minimising
(δ − ιn ⊗ β)′W (δ − ιn ⊗ β)
where ιK is a K vector consisting of ones andW is a positive definite matrix.
The covariace matrix of β is given by
V (β) =
[(ιn ⊗ I)′W (ιn ⊗ I)]−1 (ιn ⊗ I)′WV (δ)W (ιn ⊗ I) [(ιn ⊗ I)′W (ιn ⊗ I)]−1 .
In Appendix A.2 it is shown how to derive the covariance matrix of δ.
The problem with censoring is that it may introduce sample selection
bias, since children who are censored are also likely to be those who will
receive the most education. One way of dealing with the potential sample
selection is limiting the sample such that only observations that cannot be
censored are used in the estimation. The underlying idea is that children
aged more than 23 cannot be censored, because the maximum education (16
18
years), will have been obtained at that age since schooling begins at age 7
(23 = 7 + 16). Similarly, if we consider the probability of receiving 15 years
of education, all children more 22 years of age will not be censored. This
implies that, when estimating β(k) on the basis of sk, only the sub-sample
containing children aged more than 7 + k can be used. Since the selection
of the sample is then based on an exogenous variable, age, this method will
not give rise to sample selection bias.
6.3 Birth Order Effects and Completed Education
By using the model presented above, it is possible to estimate the effect of
birth order using the explanatory variables discussed in Section 5.30 Notice
that the estimation is performed on a slightly larger data set, hence we include
all children above seven.31 The estimation results are presented in Table 4.32
In column (1) and (3) absolute birth order is used, while relative birth order
is used in column (2) and (4).
[Table 4 about here.]
Focussing on column (1) and (3) we have estimated a simple specification
where we control for the sex of the child, year of birth and birth order. In
this specification the absolute and the relative birth order have positive and
very significant effects on completed education. Hence, it appears to be an
advantage to be born as one of the later children. This runs contrary to
most previous results on birth order, so we have also tried other specifica-
tions. Since most other studies have shown that the middle-born children are
disadvantaged we tried a quadratic term for birth order, a dummy for being
the first-born child together with the linear birth order term, dummies for
being among the first third and the second third of the children, plus various
other specifications. None of these turned out to be significant, however.
A potential reason why younger children receive more education, besides
what was suggested in the model above, is the potential work load younger
30The estimation of the final β is based on β(4), . . . , β(15). The remaining β(k)’s are
excluded due to very few observations.
31Summary statistics are provided in Table 1.
32For comparison, the results of the standard fixed effects estimations are presented in
Table 11 in the Appendix. Censoring is taken into account in the same way as in the
analysis of the distribution of completed education. See Section 6.
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siblings place on older children. It is, however, difficult to determine the
exact reason for the behaviour. Instead, we examine whether the birth order
effect is in any way related to other observable characteristics of the house-
hold. This is done by interacting birth order with the educational attainment
of the mother and the father, a dummy for being a girl and the value of land-
holdings, if any. For both absolute and relative birth order there is a negative
effect of parental education interacted with birth order. The effect, however,
is sufficiently strong so that the birth order effect is nonexisting for parents
with high school education (10 years) and above.
The effect of landholdings of the household is opposite to that of parental
education. There is a positive and significant effect of the value of a house-
hold’s landholding, so the birth order effect is more pronounced in families
with more valuable landholdings. One possible explanation for this behaviour
may be that the parents are trying to compensate later born children who
are presumably less likely to inherit the land than their older siblings.33 An-
other related explanation could be that parents follow an efficient investment
strategy. That would be the case if the return to education for farmers were
lower than that of other jobs after a certain level of education is achieved.
In order to investigate if birth order effects are more pronauonced for girls
than boys we include the interaction between birth order and a dummy for
girl. The interaction terms turned out to be positive but insignificant in the
specification of relative birth order, but significant and negative, although
the size is small, for absolute birth order. This indicate birth order effects
are less important for girls than boys.
In all columns there is a positive and significant effect of being a girl
on completed schooling. While this may appear to be the opposite of what
most people expect for developing countries, there are a substantial number
of developing countries where this pattern can be found.34 This pattern of
providing girls with more education on average than boys can also be found
for the parents of the children in this sample, even if it is not as strong. As
mentioned above the average education of the mothers is 5.5 years, while it is
slightly less for the fathers, who have an average of 5.3 years of education. At
33Quisumbing (1994) examines the relation between land holdings and transfers in the
Philippines, although in a different area than the one used in this paper.
34As discussed in Behrman, Duryea and Sze´kely (p. 10 1999) 2/3 of the countries the
analysed countries in Latin America and the Caribbean the educational level is higher for
girls than for boys for the cohort born in 1970. For South Africa the schooling is about
equal for men and women (Lam 1999; Anderson, Case and Lam 2001).
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the moment we can only speculate as to why there is this difference between
boys and girls. One potential reason is that the return to women’s education
is higher because it is mostly women who migrate abroad to work. While it
is beyond the scope of this study to examine this and other potential reasons,
it is definitely an area worthy of further research.
One might imagine that what appears to be a birth order effect could
simply be a cohort effect. This would be the case if the schooling system
improves over the years. The younger siblings would then find themselves
with better quality schooling and easier access to education, which could lead
to the results presented above. We have therefore included the year of birth
of the child as a control. It is surprising that the effect of year of birth is
in fact negative and significant, even though the size of the effect is quite
small. In the extreme example with a family with two children, born ten
years apart, the total effect from year of birth would only be one-tenth of the
birth order effect using the relative birth order estimates, which implies that
the birth order effect dominates strongly. This is confirmed by estimating
the models without the year of birth variable, in which case the birth order
effects are slightly smaller but still very significant.
There are two possible explanations for the negative effect of birth cohort.
First, it might be that the access and quality of schooling have decreased over
the years. Secondly, the year of birth variable is not just taking account of
the cohort effect, but also of the effect of the mother’s age when given birth.
The reason is that in the estimation we only consider differences from the
household means. Therefore, can the variable of years of birth as well be
interpreted as the effect for the mother’s age when giving birth to the child.
Hence it is not possible to separate the two effects. If children born of younger
mothers tend to do better in school that may be a possible explanation for
the negative effect of year of birth. So far, however, we have not been able
to successfully explain this somewhat peculiar result.
7 Time in School
As mentioned in the introduction and in the model section, completed educa-
tion of an individual is the final outcome of a number of different factors like
time spent in school, the quality of the school, the support of the family, the
abilities of the child, etc. Since parents do not control all these factors, they
can only influence the final education to a certain extent. When examining
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birth order effects it is interesting also to look at the effects on the time spent
on school and studying, because we suspect that parents are able to control
more directly the time in school of their children. However, it is not obvious
that birth order effects should be stronger in time spent in school than in
completed education, since time in school is only one of the inputs.
The data used in this part of the paper are based on surveys conducted in
1982, 1985, 1990 and 1992. The data contain information on how many hours
each child spent in school and on other school activities in the particular week
when the survey was conducted.35 For the analyses of time spent in school
we have limited the sample to include only children of age 7 to 18. The
sample contains 1,122 observations from 226 different households. Since we
expect the number of hours of schooling to vary with age, we have divided
the children into two groups consisting of young children from 7 to 12 years
old and older children from 13 to 18 years old.36 The distribution of time in
school is presented in Figure 1. Almost all (more than 95 per cent) of the
younger children attend school, while a large fraction (45 per cent) of older
children do not.
[Figure 1 about here.]
7.1 A Sample Selection Model
A potential problem when analysing time in school is sample selection, since
not all children attend school. In order to allow for the possibility that the
choice of attending school and the decision on the number of hours spent
in school are taken simultaneously we use the following sample selection
framework (see Davidson and McKinnon 1993). Let hij,t be the observed
hours child i in household j spends in school in period t and let dij,t be a
binary variable taking the value one if the child attends school in period t
and zero otherwise. The decisions of attending school and hours in school
are determined by two latent variables h∗ij,t and d
∗
ij,t such that
hij,t = h
∗
ij,t and dij,t = 1 if d
∗
ij,t > 0
hij,t = 0 and dij,t = 0 if d
∗
ij,t ≤ 0.
35Information on time allocation is only available if the child is still living at home.
36Summary statistics are provided in Table 1.
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We assume that the latent variables are generated by a bivariate process
where we allow for a fixed household specific effect.37 The latent variables
are given by
h∗ij,t = xij,tβ + µ
h
j + ε
h
ij,t
d∗ij,t = zij,tγ + µ
d
j + ε
d
ij,t,
where xij,t and zij,t are explanatory variables and µ
h
j and µ
d
j are unobserved
household specific effects. The conditional distributions of the error terms
εhij,t and ε
d
ij,t are assumed to be
εhij,t|xij,t, µhj ∼ iid(0, σ2h)
εdij,t|xij,t, µdj ∼ iid(0, σ2d).
This means that the conditional error terms are identically distributed ran-
dom variables with means zero. Furthermore, we allow for a potential cor-
relation between εhij,t|xij,t, µhj and εdij,t|xij,t, µdj .
The frequently used method for estimation in sample selection models
is the Heckman (1979) two step estimator. This estimation technique does
not, however, directly apply when fixed effects are present. The problem is
that the Heckman procedure requires a consistent estimate of the parameters
associated with the binary variable and that estimating these parameters in a
fixed effects models may lead to inconsistent estimates if the number of time
periods is small.38 Furthermore, identification is only achieved through the
functional form if the same factors determine both participation and time in
school as is the case here. Yet, in a recent article by Kyriazidou (1997) a new
method is proposed to estimate sample selection models for panel data with
fixed effects. Although this method is developed for models with individual
fixed effects rather than household specific fixed effects the methodology can
easily be modified to cover this framework.
The underlying idea of Kyriazidou’s method is to use a kind of difference
estimator to eliminate the fixed effects in the same way as is usually done in
37In the terms of relative birth order it is theoretically possible to estimate the model
with an individual fixed effect, because the relative birth order can change from one
period to the next. In practice, however, the variation in relative birth order is too small
to perform the estimation with an individual fixed effect.
38The inconsistency in a logit model with fixed effects is discussed in Andersen (1973)
and Chamberlain (1980).
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linear panel models. By using differences between pair of observations from
the same households where the selection terms are equal (zij,tγ = zkj,sγ)
39 or
at least “close”, both the selection term and the fixed effect are eliminated.
The estimation is based on a weighted regression where observations with
selection terms that are “close” are given more weight. In our notation
βˆ =
 J∑
j=1
1
nj − 1
∑
(i,k,t,t)∈A
ψˆj(xij,t − xkj,s)′(xij,t − xkj,s)dij,tdkj,s
−1
×
 J∑
j=1
1
nj − 1
∑
(i,k,t,t)∈A
ψˆj(xij,t − xkj,s)′(hij,t − hkj,s)dij,tdkj,s
 ,
where nj is the number of observations for household j and A is a subset
containing all different combinations of the observations for household j.
The weights ψˆj are a function of the “sample selection terms” and they are
chosen to be given by a kernel with band width bw and kernel density K.
Then,
ψˆj =
1
bw
K
(
(zij,t − zkj,s)γˆ
bw
)
.
The normal density is used as the kernel. The band width is chosen and
afterwards a bias correction estimator is constructed using the procedures
described in Kyriazidou (1997). To be able to construct the weights we
need a consistent estimate of γ. This is done using a conditional maximum
likelihood estimator, which according to Chamberlain (1980) is a consistent
estimator given that the binary variable is generated by a logit model.
A crucial assumption for using this method is that at least one of the
variables determining the participation process does not enter the equation
for hours. Since the mandatory schooling is from seven to completing ele-
mentary school, normally at age 12, we expect a dummy variable for children
aged seven to 12 as a good predictor for participation.40 Furthermore, we
assume that this variables does not affect the time spent on school activities.
Using this variable as an exclusive restriction we are able to estimate the
model.
39The selection term is some function of zij,tγ.
40This seems to be confirmed by the graph.
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7.2 The Estimation Results
Except for the a dummy variable of being older than mandatory school age,
we use the same explanatory variables for both participation and time in
school, and the same measures of birth order as in the previous analyses.
To examine the extent of the problem with incomplete fertility spells we
have used both the number of children in the household for each year and
the completed fertility measured in 1998 when computing the relative birth
order. We do not, however, find any significant differences in the results and
since using the 1998 fertility data restricts the sample size we have used the
current household size. Besides the explanatory variable used for the analysis
of completed education, we include age and age squared and a dummy for
being aged more than 12.41 These variables are included to control for the
changes in the amount of schooling over age.42 The estimation results are
reported in Tables 5 and 6.
[Table 5 about here.]
[Table 6 about here.]
Examining the results of the participation in school very few variables are
significant. The most significant variables are the age variables indicating a
strong age pattern in the participation. In none of the analyses the effect of
birth order is significant. This implies that birth order seems less important
for the participation in school.43
When looking at the results for the number of hours the evidence is mixed.
For the specification using relative birth order, the birth order variables are
not significant. Therefore we concentrate the discussion to the specification
using absolute birth order. In this specification we find strong and positive
birth order effects. The only interaction term which has a significant impact
is the interaction with the girl dummy. Since this effect is found to be negative
this results are in consistent with the results for completed education, which
means that birth order effects are less important for girl. Also year of birth
41The ratio participating in school drops by about 15 percentage points between 12 and
13 years old.
42Other functions of age has been tried but the results of the remaining parameters are
almost unaffected.
43Like in the previous analyses of completed education other measures of birth order
have also been applied.
25
seem to have a positive and significant impact on the hours spent in school.
This result is in contrast to the result found for completed education..
Commenting on the remaining estimates we find that the age variable are
significant. There is positive effect on hours in school for girls although it is
not significant in column (1).
To sum up, the results from the participation and hours of work are less
clear than for the completed education. We find weaker evidence for birth
order effects in the participation and in most of the specification of hours of
school than in completed education. However, the evidence for this analysis
seems to be consistent with the fact that last born are spending more time
in school.
8 Conclusion
To our knowledge there has so far been no attempt at combining models
of intrahousehold allocation and fertility decisions into one model, which is
especially probelmatic when analysing the effects of birth order on intra-
household allocation since birth order is the realisation of fertility. We have
shown, using a model of intrahousehold allocation with endogenous fertil-
ity, that birth order effects can arise even without parents having stronger
preferences for children with specific birth order or the endowments of the
children being related to birth order. The model shows that parents tend
to favour the last-born children and that it of great importance to treat fer-
tility correctly when estimating intrahousehold allocation. Furthermore, the
model provides a possible explanation for why compensatory behaviour has
not been observed since the model predicts that parents which are inequality
averse will only have one child.
There are two major directions in which the model could be developed in
the future. The first is to introduce more explicitly the dynamic element of
fertility decisions. This would allow us to analyse the importance of when the
genetic endowments of children are observed by parents. The second direction
is to incorporate the model in a time use framework (like the one use for
standard household models), such that the decisions on consumption, labour
supply, fertility and investment in children were simultaneous.44 Doing this
would allow a better treatment of feedbacks between siblings, such as the
44This would make both the amount of resources devoted to children, R, and the costs
of children, k, endogenous.
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possibility that some children work or take care of younger siblings, and
the possibility that parental labour supply can change in response to the
characteristics of their children.
Using a longitudinal data set from the Philippines we find strong evidence
for a birth order effect in both completed education and time spent on school
activities. The estimation results indicate that the last-born children receive
more education than their earlier-born siblings. Furthermore, we find that
the effect of birth order is less pronounced in families where the parents have
more education while it is stronger in families holding land. These results tie
in nicely with the results from the analysis of the within family variation in
completed education. This shows that there is less variation the higher the
education of the parents and more variation when the family owns more land.
The findings are also consistent with the predictions of the model suggested,
although they do not constitute a direct test of it.45
This paper also gives rise to a number of interesting questions that de-
serve more attention. First, as discussed, we have controlled for household
heterogeneity but not for individual heterogeneity. Using the longitudinal as-
pect of the data set and a dynamic programming model, it may be possible
to also control for individual heterogeneity. Secondly, the large difference
between the length of boys’ and girls’ education should be analysed in more
depth. Finally, we have suggested possible reasons for the strong effect of
land holdings, but without further analysis it is not possible to provide a
completely satisfactory answer. One possible beneficial approach is to look
at patterns of inheritance as suggested in this paper.
45One possible way to directly test the model would be to estimate whether birth order
effects exist in aptitude test scores (in the hope that these measure innate ability).
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A Appendix
A.1 The Model
This section shows, in detail, the implications of the model outlined in Section
3. The maximisation problem of the parents is:
max
n,{Si}n1
U =
(
n∑
i=1
aiH
c
i
)1/c
c ≤ 1, c 6= 0 subject to
Hi = GiS
α
i
R ≥
n∑
i=1
(Si) + nk
Gi ∼ Gf (mi, σ2i ).
To simplify notation assume ai = 1 ∀ i.46 For a given n the optimal distri-
bution of schooling inputs are
Si = (R− nk) G
c
1−αc
i∑n
j=1G
c
1−αc
j
. (6)
Utility is then
Un = (R− nk)α
[
n∑
i=1
G
c
1−αc
i
] 1−αc
c
. (7)
Hence, if parents have only one child the realised utility is simply
U1 = G1(R− k)α,
which is independent of the value of c.
Since the problem is sequential we can solve it backwards.47 To fix ideas
assume that R = 5k. In that case it will never be optimal to have five
children, since there would not be any resources left to invest in schooling.
Furthermore, assume that the genetic endowments of future children are
distributed uniformly between zero and one (both included). Hence, parents
46We already assumed that the weights are equal for all children.
47It turns out that this is not really necessary, but it makes it easier to solve.
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with three children with genetic endowments of G1, G2 and G3 will decide
to have the fourth child when
U3(G1, G2, G3) < E[U4(G1, G2, G3, G4)], (8)
which translates into
(R− 3k)α
[
3∑
i=1
G
c
1−αc
i
] 1−αc
c
< (R− 4k)α
∫ 1
0
[
4∑
i=1
G
c
1−αc
i
] 1−αc
c
dG4. (9)
This inequality provides us with a condition on
∑3
i=1G
c
1−αc
i . If that condition
is not fulfilled because the “sum”48 of the genetic endowments of the first
three children is too high then parents will not have the fourth child.
This can, for example, be seen in the case where c = 1 and α = 1
2
.49
Equation (9) then becomes
2
(
R− 3k
R− 4k
) 1
2
<
(∑3
i=1G
2
i + 1∑3
i=1G
2
i
) 1
2
+
(
3∑
i=1
G2i
) 1
2
× log
1 + (1 +∑3i=1G2i ) 12(∑3
i=1G
2
i
) 1
2
 . (10)
Using that R = 5k and solving leads to the condition
3∑
i=1
G2i / 0.3. (11)
This condition on the sum of genetic endowments can then be used when
analysing the choice whether parents with two children want a third child.
If the sum of the first two children’s genetic endowments is higher than that
required to have four children (in our case with c = 1 and α = .5 this would
be
∑2
i=1G
2
i ' 0.3) then we can focus on comparing the utility of having two
48When we refer to the sum of the genetic endowments we are referring to the sum over
the individual genetic endowments after they are raised to the power determined by c and
α.
49The integral has a “nice” closed-form solution when c1−αc =
1
2 . The results that will
be discussed do, however, hold for other values as well.
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children with the expected utility of having three children.50 Doing that for
our example reveals that for parents to have three children it must be the
case that
2∑
i=1
G2i / 0.62. (12)
Of course, parents with children where the sum of the first two children’s
genetic endowment is less than that may have four children as well, provided
that the sum of the three children’s genetic endowment is less than the 0.3
found above. Finally for parents to decide to have two children the square of
the first child’s genetic endowment has to be less than approximately 0.95.
Hence, what we in effect have is an optimal stopping rule. Parents will
go from having n children to having n+ 1 until
(R− nk)α
[
n∑
i=1
G
c
1−αc
i
] 1−αc
c
>
(R− (n+ 1)k)α
∫ [n+1∑
i=1
G
c
1−αc
i
] 1−αc
c
g(Gn+1) dGn+1. (13)
This stopping rule gets easier and easier to fulfill as the number of chil-
dren increases. Hence, parents that draw very high endowment children will
stop having children earlier than those that draw low endowment children
(provided they have the same distribution function). There is no need to
worry about the utility of having n + 2 or more children since for the stop-
ping rule the requirement derived from the expected utility of n+1 children
is stronger than for n+ 2 or more as can be seen from the discussion above.
A.1.1 The Cobb-Douglas Case
At c = 0 the utility function becomes a Cobb-Douglas function
U =
n∏
i=1
Hi
It is straightforward to show that, for a given number of children, the size of
the schooling input is the same for all children. Hence, the realised utility
50The main advantage of this is that it is easier to solve.
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for parents with n children will be
Un =
n∏
i=1
Gi
(
R− nk
n
)nα
(14)
One implication of Cobb-Douglas preferences is that when deciding on
whether to have an extra child the genetic endowments of previous children
do not matter. For parents with n children to decide on having n+1 children
requires that∫ n+1∏
i=1
Gi
(
R− (n+ 1)k
n+ 1
)(n+1)α
g(Gn+1) dGn+1
>
n∏
i=1
Gi
(
R− nk
n
)nα
. (15)
After reducing, this leads to the following condition on the expected genetic
endowment of the n+ 1’st child∫
Gn+1 g(Gn+1) dGn+1 >
(
R− nk
n
)nα(
R− (n+ 1)k
n+ 1
)−(n+1)α
. (16)
A.1.2 The Inequality Averse Case
If c < 0 parents with more than one child will compensate the children
which have lower endowments.51 We show, however, that if c < 0 it is never
optimal to have more than one child. To simplify the notation denote 1−αc
c
by β. If c < 0 then it follows that β < 0. The proof is made by contradiction.
Assume that it is optimal for a household to have two children. This implies
by equation (5) that
(R− k)αG1 < (R− 2k)α
∫ (
G
1/β
1 +G
1/β
2
)β
g(G2)dG2.
From this we must have that
G1 <
(
R− k
R− 2k
)α
G1 <
∫ (
G
1/β
1 +G
1/β
2
)β
g(G2)dG2, (17)
51This includes the special case of Rawlsian preferences where c = −∞. In this case the
parents’ utility function becomes a Leontif function U = min(H1, . . . ,Hn) and they care
only about the child with the least amount of human capital.
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since
(
R−k
R−2k
)α
> 1, which follows from α > 0.
To prove the contradiction we show that(
G
1/β
1 +G
1/β
2
)β
< G1.
First notice that the function
f(x) =
(
G
1/β
1 + x
)β
, x ≥ 0,
is a monotonic decreasing function.52 This implies that
(
G
1/β
1 +G
1/β
2
)β
<(
G
1/β
1
)β
= G1. Substituting this expression in to∫ (
G
1/β
1 +G
1/β
2
)β
g(G2)dG2 <
∫
G1g(G2)dG2 = G1.
However if we compare this with equation (17) we have a contradiction.
Hence, it will never be optimal to have more than one child.
A.1.3 Simulation Study
This subsection describes the simulation study. All of the simulations are
based on 2000 households and with the genetic endowments uniformly dis-
tributed between 1 and 99. For Tables 7 to 9 each household has 100 units
of resources (R = 100), the fixed cost of a child is 10 units (k = 10) and
α = 0.9. The simulations in are done with c = 0.25, 0.5, 0.75 and 1. These
values are chosen because they lie in the range of the estimates Behrman
(1988b) found. The maximum number of children is ten (since R = 100 and
k = 10).
Table 7 shows the number of children with a specific birth order. No fam-
ily has more than eight children and as inequality aversion falls (c increases)
the number of children goes down. Hence, a little less than 40 per cent of the
household have only one child and only three households have eight children.
[Table 7 about here.]
52This can easily be seen from ∂f∂x = β(G
1/β
1 + x)
β−1 < 0 for all x ≥ 0.
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The first part of Table 8 shows the average schooling input by birth order
and the difference from the family mean in schooling input. The second
part shows the average human capital of the children by birth order and
the difference to the family mean. For low levels of c there is an equal
distribution of schooling inputs and consequently also an equal distribution
of human capital by birth order. Looking, however, at c = 1 the average
schooling input and the human capital outcome decrease with birth order.
This pattern is, however, completely reversed if we look at differences to the
family mean. Then higher birth order children tend to received more than
their earlier born children.
[Table 8 about here.]
Table 9 summaries the information from the two previous tables by show-
ing how fertility, mean schooling input and differences in schooling input and
human capital between first and last born children and from either to the
family mean. Again we can see that as inequality aversion decreases the
children of higher birth orders do better than their older siblings.
[Table 9 about here.]
Finally, Table 10 show how the summary statistics presented in Table 9
change when the amount of resources devoted to children and the cost of
children changes. The simulations are again based on 2000 households with
α = 0.9 and the inequality aversion is fixed at c = 0.75. The cost of children
is either k = 10 or k = 20 and the amounts of resources are R = 80, R = 100
and R = 120. All combinations of cost and resources are shown. As in Table
9 fertility and mean human capital (all) are calculated over all families, while
the other measures are for families with two or more children.
[Table 10 about here.]
A.2 The Covariance Matrix of δ = (β(0), β(1), . . . , β(K−1))
When estimating the covariance of δ we use the framework of moment con-
ditions. Let d
(k)
ij be an indicator of whether the observation of child j in
household i is used in the estimation of β(k). The observation is used if it is
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uncensored and if there exists some variation in the outcome of s
(k)
ij within
the household, which formally can be written as
ageij > k + 7
∃j, l such s(k)ij 6= s(k)il and ageij, ageil > k + 7
The probability of s
(k)
ij = 1 given the total outcome for household i is denoted
p
(k)
ij :
p
(k)
ij = Pr(s
(k)
ij = 1|
ni∑
j=1
d
(k)
ij s
(k)
ij ),
where ni is the number of observations in household i. Now we can define
the moment condition for each observation
l
(k)
ij = d
(k)
ij
(s
(k)
ij − p(k)ij )
p
(k)
ij (1− p(k)ij )
∂p
(k)
ij
∂β(k)
,
such that the unconditional expectations of l
(k)
ij equals zero, E(l
(k)
ij ) = 0. The
covariance matrix of δ can then be derived from l = (l(0), . . . , l(K−1)) and is
given by
V (δ) = D−1(l′l)D−1,
where D is a bloc-diagonal matrix and each bloc consists of
D(k) =
∂l(k)
∂β(k)
.
[Table 11 about here.]
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
1998 1982-1992
Mean St.d. Mean St.d.
Years of Education 8.89 3.43
Hours of school (per week) 31.41 19.72
Year of Birth 1970 8.85 1973 4.63
Age 28.18 8.35 13.02 3.26
Girls 0.47 0.50 0.47 0.50
Birth Order 4.41 2.80 5.04 2.87
Mother’s Education (in years) 4.96 2.41 5.03 2.35
Father’s education (in years) 4.79 2.72 4.83 2.68
Landowners 0.23 0.42 0.10 0.30
Value of land Owneda 0.88 0.83 1.10 1.55
Observations 817 1470
Note. a in 10 millions of pesos
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Table 2: Within Family Variation in Years of Schoolinga
OLS
All Boys Girls
Mother’s Education −0.105 −0.209 −0.050
(0.040)∗∗∗ (0.058)∗∗∗ (0.051)
Father’s Education −0.028 −0.039 −0.033
(0.039) (0.055) (0.045)
Value of Land Owned 0.335 0.109 −0.200
(0.300) (0.368) (0.326)
Constant 2.690 3.038 2.286
(0.242)∗∗∗ (0.365)∗∗∗ (0.280)∗∗∗
R2 0.09 0.14 0.03
Observations 124 97 101
Note. — Standard errors in parentheses.
a : Measured by the standard deviation of schooling within a family.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
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Table 3: Mean Education by Birth Order
All Boys Girls
Birth Order Mean Obs Mean Obs. Mean Obs.
1 9.23 125 8.57 58 9.80 67
2 9.23 124 8.40 60 10.01 64
3 9.13 115 8.42 61 9.92 54
4 8.78 104 8.20 62 9.71 41
5 9.47 87 8.81 48 10.28 39
6 9.13 69 8.96 31 9.26 38
7 9.07 53 8.89 28 9.28 25
8 8.67 40 8.50 24 8.94 16
9 9.00 27 9.29 17 8.50 12
10 8.66 22 8.00 10 9.58 12
11 7.64 14 6.00 6 8.80 8
12 7.8 5 6.33 3 10.00 2
13 11.00 3 11.00 1 1.00 2
14 12.00 1 12.00 1 . 0
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Table 4: Completed Education
Ordered Logit Estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dummy for Girl 0.932∗∗∗ 1.356∗∗∗ 0.975∗∗∗ 0.927∗∗∗
(0.067) (0.152) (0.068) (0.113)
Year of Birth −0.051∗∗∗ −0.028∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗ −0.039∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Birth Order 0.245∗∗∗ 0.410∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.023)
Birth Order × Mother’s Education −0.041∗∗∗
(0.005)
Birth Order × Father’s Education −0.011∗∗∗
(0.002)
Birth Order × Value of Land 0.401∗∗∗
(0.001)
Birth Order × Dummy for Girl −0.089∗∗∗
(0.034)
Relative Birth Order 0.860∗∗∗ 3.042∗∗∗
(0.137) (0.232)
Relative Birth Order × Mother’s Education −0.182∗∗∗
(0.036)
Relative Birth Order × Father’s Education −0.193∗∗∗
(0.016)
Relative Birth Order × Value of Land 2.962∗∗∗
(0.461)
Relative Birth Order × Dummy for Girl 0.159
(0.227)
Observations 817 817 817 817
Number of Households 125 125 125 125
Note. — Standard errors in parentheses.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
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Table 5: Participation in Schoola
Conditional logit Estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dummy for Girl 0.312 0.436 0.329 0.491
(0.202) (0.424) (0.203) (0.436)
Age 0.771∗ 0.756∗ 0.796∗∗ 0.771∗
(0.394) (0.398) (0.395) (0.398)
Age Squared −0.039∗∗∗ −0.039∗∗∗ −0.040∗∗∗ −0.040∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013)
Dummy for Age > 12 −1.638∗∗∗ −1.621∗∗∗ −1.635∗∗∗ −1.597∗∗∗
(0.522) (0.524) (0.523) (0.525)
Year of Birth 0.074 0.081 0.156∗∗∗ 0.157∗∗∗
(0.083) (0.085) (0.050) (0.051)
Birth Order 0.155 0.121
(0.198) (0.210)
Birth Order × Mother’s Education −0.003
(0.002)
Birth Order × Father’s Education 0.012
(0.011)
Birth Order × Value of Land −0.075
(0.051)
Birth Order × Dummy for Girl −0.021
(0.072)
Relative Birth Order −0.365 −0.318
(0.701) (0.810)
Relative Birth Order × Mother’s Education −0.024
(0.022)
Relative Birth Order × Father’s Education 0.048
(0.038)
Relative Birth Order × Value of Land −0.345
(0.365)
Relative Birth Order × Dummy for Girl −0.276
(0.705)
Observations 1122 1122 1122 1122
Number of Households 226 226 226 226
Note. — Standard errors in parentheses.
a : Children aged 7 to 18 that spends a positive amount of time in school.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. 43
Table 6: Time Spent on School Activitiesa
Kyriazidou’s Method
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dummy for Girl 1.228∗ 7.915∗∗∗ 1.376∗∗ 3.909∗∗
(0.719) (1.467) (0.653) (1.928)
Year of Birth 0.947∗∗∗ 0.560 2.461∗∗∗ 2.002∗∗∗
(0.346) (0.369) (0.281) (0.280)
Age 4.805∗∗ 5.054∗∗∗ 6.435∗∗∗ 4.437∗∗
(1.939) (1.872) (1.751) (1.787)
Age Squared −0.092 −0.106 −0.198∗∗ −0.104
(0.095) (0.091) (0.086) (0.087)
Birth Order 2.096∗∗ 3.543∗∗∗
(0.886) (0.970)
Birth Order × Mother’s Education 0.019
(0.021)
Birth Order × Father’s Education 0.018
(0.026)
Birth Order × Value of Land 0.204
(0.136)
Birth Order × Dummy for Girl −1.116∗∗∗
(0.176)
Relative Birth Order −8.712 −4.428
(2.452) (3.532)
Relative Birth Order × Mother’s Education −0.172
(0.114)
Relative Birth Order × Father’s Education 0.163∗∗
(0.065)
Relative Birth Order × Value of Land 0.135
(2.881)
Relative Birth Order × Dummy for Girl −4.653∗
(2.473)
Observations 1470 1470 1470 1470
Number of Households 201 201 201 201
Note. — Standard errors in in parentheses.
a : Number of hours spent in school by children aged 7 to 18.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
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Table 7: Simulation - Number of Children
Birth Order c = 0.25 c = 0.5 c = 0.75 c = 1.0
1 2000 2000 2000 2000
2 2000 2000 2000 1253
3 2000 2000 1510 753
4 2000 2000 808 395
5 2000 1961 334 197
6 2000 1011 90 75
7 2000 89 10 15
8 1918 2 0 3
53otes: 2000 households with R = 100, k = 10 and α = 0.9.
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Table 8: Simulation - Schooling and Human Capital
Schooling Input
Average Difference to Family Mean
Birth Order c = 0.25 c = 0.5 c = 0.75 c = 1.0 c = 0.25 c = 0.5 c = 0.75 c = 1.0
1 1.9 5.5 13.4 23.2 −0.0 −0.1 −1.7 −9.0
2 1.9 5.5 13.3 20.7 −0.0 −0.1 −1.7 3.6
3 1.9 5.6 12.8 20.5 0.0 −0.0 1.2 9.1
4 1.9 5.6 11.6 17.1 −0.0 −0.1 3.2 9.2
5 1.9 5.6 11.5 15.9 −0.0 −0.0 5.4 10.1
6 1.9 5.2 11.1 14.8 −0.0 0.7 6.7 10.5
7 1.9 4.5 6.8 9.3 −0.0 1.5 3.8 6.4
8 1.9 4.5 9.4 0.0 2.6 7.5
Human Capital Outcome
Average Difference to Family Mean
Birth Order c = 0.25 c = 0.5 c = 0.75 c = 1.0 c = 0.25 c = 0.5 c = 0.75 c = 1.0
1 98.7 292.2 733.3 1229.7 −0.9 −11.1 −110.6 −495.6
2 98.6 293.7 729.2 1109.7 −0.9 −9.6 −114.7 198.1
3 100.1 300.2 699.7 1105.5 0.5 −3.1 86.2 510.4
4 98.6 293.8 623.2 897.5 −0.9 −9.5 209.0 501.0
5 98.9 294.7 619.4 837.0 −0.6 −1.0 334.8 551.8
6 98.9 270.6 610.8 803.0 −0.7 58.0 417.5 598.7
7 99.1 226.0 328.1 535.9 −0.5 110.1 219.1 408.1
8 99.3 198.2 387.4 4.1 134.0 319.2
Notes: 2000 households with R = 100, k = 10 and α = 0.9.
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Table 9: Simulation - Summary Statistics
c = 0.25 c = 0.5 c = 0.75 c = 1.0
Fertility 7.96 5.53 3.38 2.35
Schooling
Mean Schooling Input (all) 1.90 5.67 15.06 32.18
Mean Schooling Input (2+) 1.90 5.67 15.06 17.14
First-born to family average −0.00 −0.13 −1.68 −14.29
Last-born to family average −0.02 0.50 4.57 22.25
Last-born - first-born 0.03 0.64 6.24 36.54
Human Capital
Mean Human Capital (all) 99.55 303.34 843.92 1725.29
Mean Human Capital (2+) 99.55 303.34 843.92 911.59
First-born to family average −0.88 −11.10 −110.61 −791.03
Last-born to family average 3.92 41.74 298.45 1228.11
Last-born - first-born 4.80 52.83 409.06 2019.14
Notes: 2000 households with R = 100, k = 10 and α = 0.9.
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Table 10: Simulation - Resources and Costs of Children
R = 80 R = 100 R = 120
k = 10 k = 20 k = 10 k = 20 k = 10 k = 20
Fertility 2.70 1.58 3.38 1.82 4.03 2.10
Schooling
Mean Schooling Input (All) 17.17 26.20 15.06 30.12 14.79 32.19
Mean Schooling Input (2+) 13.47 12.34 15.06 16.29 14.79 19.56
First-born to family average −3.07 −6.08 −1.68 −7.04 −1.69 −7.37
Last-born to family average 5.34 6.53 4.57 8.43 5.40 9.87
Last-born - first-born 8.41 12.60 6.24 15.47 7.09 17.24
Human Capital
Mean Human Capital (All) 975.20 1293.45 843.92 1534.55 830.94 1680.88
Mean Human Capital (2+) 723.86 522.48 843.92 733.24 830.94 927.51
First-born to family average −206.72 −345.46 −110.61 −416.11 −111.17 −445.51
Last-born to family average 350.28 371.18 298.45 492.96 351.43 587.01
Last-born - first-born 557.00 716.65 409.06 909.07 462.60 1032.52
Notes: 2000 households with α = 0.9 and c = 0.75.
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Table 11: Completed Education
Fixed Effects Estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dummy for Girl 0.929∗∗∗ 1.239∗∗∗ 0.929∗∗∗ 1.064∗∗∗
(0.181) (0.334) (0.183) (0.316)
Year of Birth −0.137∗∗∗ −0.123∗∗∗ −0.011 −0.062∗
(0.044) (0.045) (0.031) (0.033)
Birth Order 0.429∗∗∗ 0.674∗∗∗
(0.111) (0.135)
Birth Order × Mother’s Education −0.030∗
(0.017)
Birth Order × Father’s Education −0.034∗∗
(0.014)
Birth Order × Value of Land 0.331∗∗
(0.129)
Birth Order × Dummy for Girl −0.074
(0.063)
Relative Birth Order 0.765 4.162∗∗∗
(0.564) (1.009)
Relative Birth Order × Mother’s Education −0.269∗∗
(0.112)
Relative Birth Order × Father’s Education −0.250∗∗
(0.103)
Relative Birth Order × Value of Land 1.511∗∗
(0.766)
Relative Birth Order × Dummy for Girl −0.302
(0.544)
Observations 790 790 790 790
Number of Households 125 125 125 125
Note. — Standard errors in parentheses.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
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Figure 1: The Distribution of Time Spent on School Activities
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